internal/firewall/firewall.go komplett neu: joint zone-iface-mapping
(network_interfaces.role), address objects + groups (members
expandiert), services + groups, rules, nat-rules. Output: einheitliche
View mit Legs (rule × service cross-product) damit das Template kein
sub-template/dict braucht.
Template:
* Anti-Lockout-Block am input-chain-Top (SSH+443 immer erlaubt,
KANN nicht von Custom-Rules overruled werden — User-Wunsch).
* Rules: pro Leg eine nft-Zeile mit iif/oif sets, ip saddr/daddr,
proto+dport, optional log-prefix.
* prerouting_nat: iteriert dnat-Rules.
* postrouting_nat: snat + masquerade.
Auto-apply: FirewallHandler bekommt einen Reloader-Hook der nach
jedem POST/PUT/DELETE aufgerufen wird. main.go injected
firewall.New(pool).Render — schreibt + sudo nft -f.
Sudoers (/etc/sudoers.d/edgeguard): NOPASSWD für 'nft -f
/etc/edgeguard/nftables.d/ruleset.nft'. configgen.ReloadService
nutzt jetzt sudo (haproxy reload klappte vorher nicht aus dem
edgeguard-User).
Frontend (Sweep): style={{ marginBottom: 16 }} → className="mb-16"
in allen 7 Firewall-Tabs — User-Feedback "globales CSS statt inline".
Live auf 89.163.205.6: nft list table inet edgeguard zeigt
Anti-Lockout + Baseline + Cluster-Peer-Set + (jetzt noch leere)
Custom-Rules-Sektion. render-config postinst-mäßig sauber.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
93 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
93 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
// Package configgen contains shared helpers used by the per-service
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// renderers in internal/{haproxy,firewall,squid,wireguard,unbound}/.
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//
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// Each renderer satisfies the Generator interface: Render reads state
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// from PG, writes the rendered config to /etc/edgeguard/<svc>/ via
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// AtomicWrite, then signals the running daemon via systemctl reload
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// (or its service-specific reload command). Failures are surfaced
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// to the caller — the orchestrator decides whether one bad renderer
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// aborts the whole run.
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package configgen
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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)
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// Generator is the contract every per-service renderer satisfies.
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//
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// Name returns a stable identifier ("haproxy", "nftables", …)
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// used in CLI output and audit logs. Render does the actual write +
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// reload work; ctx may be cancelled (e.g. orchestrator timeout).
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type Generator interface {
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Name() string
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Render(ctx context.Context) error
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}
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// ErrNotImplemented is returned by stub renderers (squid, wireguard,
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// unbound in v1). The orchestrator treats it as a soft skip — logged
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// but never fatal.
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var ErrNotImplemented = errors.New("renderer not implemented yet")
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// AtomicWrite writes data to path atomically via a temp file in the
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// same directory + rename. Both the temp file and the final file are
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// fsync'd to make the rename durable across an OS crash. Mode is
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// applied AFTER the rename so the previous file's permissions don't
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// leak through.
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func AtomicWrite(path string, data []byte, mode os.FileMode) error {
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dir := filepath.Dir(path)
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if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o750); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("mkdir %s: %w", dir, err)
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}
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tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".eg-render-*")
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("tempfile: %w", err)
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}
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tmpPath := tmp.Name()
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defer os.Remove(tmpPath) // no-op if rename succeeded
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if _, err := tmp.Write(data); err != nil {
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tmp.Close()
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return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", tmpPath, err)
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}
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if err := tmp.Sync(); err != nil {
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tmp.Close()
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return fmt.Errorf("fsync %s: %w", tmpPath, err)
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}
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if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("close %s: %w", tmpPath, err)
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}
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if err := os.Chmod(tmpPath, mode); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("chmod %s: %w", tmpPath, err)
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}
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if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, path); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("rename %s → %s: %w", tmpPath, path, err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ReloadService runs `sudo -n systemctl reload <name>.service`.
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// edgeguard-api runs as the unprivileged `edgeguard` user; postinst
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// installs a sudoers entry NOPASSWD-ing exactly this command per
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// service that needs it.
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//
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// Some services don't support reload (nftables — no daemon); for
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// those, callers should run the service-specific reload directly
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// rather than calling this helper.
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func ReloadService(name string) error {
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cmd := exec.Command("sudo", "-n", "/usr/bin/systemctl", "reload", name+".service")
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if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("sudo systemctl reload %s.service: %w (output: %s)", name, err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
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}
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return nil
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}
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// EtcEdgeguard is the on-target config root. Templated path used by
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// all renderers — never let renderers hard-code their own.
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const EtcEdgeguard = "/etc/edgeguard"
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