Renderer berechnet inbound-accept-Rules aus dem laufenden
Service-State — Operator legt keine FW-Rule mehr für DNS/Squid/WG-
Listen-Sockets manuell an.
internal/firewall:
* View.AutoRules + AutoFWRule struct (proto, port, optional dst-IP,
comment).
* loadAutoRules quert cross-service:
- DNS: dns_settings.listen_addresses ohne 127.x/::1 → udp+tcp 53
pro IP (mit ip daddr X-match).
- Squid: count(active forward_proxy_acls) > 0 → tcp 3128 (any IP,
squid bindet 0.0.0.0).
- WireGuard: server-mode + listen_port → udp <port> pro Iface.
* nft-Template emittiert eigene "Service-Auto-Rules"-Section vor
Operator-Rules. Comment im nft-Output zeigt source-service.
* LoadAutoRules exportiert für Handler-Endpoint.
Handler:
* GET /api/v1/firewall/auto-rules — gibt die berechnete Liste
zurück damit die UI sie anzeigen kann.
* FirewallHandler.Pool field + ctor-arg dazugekommen.
UI:
* SystemRulesCard fetcht /firewall/auto-rules + merged sie unter
die statischen Anti-Lockout-Rows. 30s-Polling. Operator sieht
jetzt im /firewall/Rules-Tab oben warum z.B. udp/53 offen ist
(auto: DNS auf 10.10.20.1).
Cleanup: alte manuelle DNS+WG-Rules per SQL gelöscht — Auto-Rules
übernehmen.
Version 1.0.38.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
131 lines
6.6 KiB
Smarty
131 lines
6.6 KiB
Smarty
#!/usr/sbin/nft -f
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# Generated by edgeguard-api — DO NOT EDIT.
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# Source: internal/firewall/firewall.go.
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# Re-generate via `edgeguard-ctl render-config` or via API mutations.
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flush ruleset
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table inet edgeguard {
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set peer_ipv4 {
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type ipv4_addr; flags interval
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{{- if .PeerIPv4}}
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elements = { {{range $i, $ip := .PeerIPv4}}{{if $i}}, {{end}}{{$ip}}{{end}} }
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{{- end}}
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}
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set peer_ipv6 {
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type ipv6_addr; flags interval
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{{- if .PeerIPv6}}
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elements = { {{range $i, $ip := .PeerIPv6}}{{if $i}}, {{end}}{{$ip}}{{end}} }
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{{- end}}
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}
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chain input {
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type filter hook input priority 0; policy drop;
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# ── ANTI-LOCKOUT (immer aktiv, kann von keiner Custom-Rule overruled werden) ──
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# nft input-chain wird top-down evaluiert; eine accept-Action terminiert.
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# Diese Block kommt VOR den Custom-Rules — d.h. selbst wenn ein
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# Operator versehentlich „drop alles" baut, bleibt SSH + Admin-UI
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# erreichbar.
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tcp dport 22 ct state new limit rate 10/minute accept comment "anti-lockout: SSH (rate-limited)"
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tcp dport 443 accept comment "anti-lockout: HAProxy public HTTPS"
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tcp dport 3443 accept comment "anti-lockout: Management-UI (HAProxy admin HTTPS)"
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# Stateful baseline
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ct state established,related accept
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ct state invalid drop
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iif lo accept
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# ICMP — keep PMTUD and basic diagnostics
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ip protocol icmp icmp type { echo-request, destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept
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ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 icmpv6 type { echo-request, destination-unreachable, packet-too-big, time-exceeded, parameter-problem, nd-router-solicit, nd-router-advert, nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert } accept
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# Public ingress: HAProxy serves :80 (ACME + redirect)
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tcp dport 80 accept
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# Cluster-internal: peers reach edgeguard-api over mTLS on :8443
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tcp dport 8443 ip saddr @peer_ipv4 accept
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tcp dport 8443 ip6 saddr @peer_ipv6 accept
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# ── Service-Auto-Rules (DNS/Squid/WG/...) ──
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# Aus dem laufenden Service-State abgeleitet — Operator
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# editiert diese nicht. Wenn der Service entfernt/disabled
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# wird, ist die Rule beim nächsten Render weg.
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{{range .AutoRules}}
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{{if .DstIP}}ip daddr {{.DstIP}} {{end}}{{.Proto}} dport {{.Port}} accept comment "auto: {{.Comment}}"
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{{end}}
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# ── Operator-defined rules ──
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{{range .Legs}}
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# rule {{.RuleID}}{{if .Name}} ({{.Name}}){{end}}{{if .Comment}} — {{.Comment}}{{end}}
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{{- /* Body MUSS auf EIGENER Zeile starten (nicht via {{- }} an
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die Comment-Zeile angehängt — sonst frisst nft die rule
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als Teil des # Kommentars). */ -}}
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{{""}}
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{{if .SrcIfaces}}iifname { {{join .SrcIfaces ", "}} } {{end}}{{if .DstIfaces}}oifname { {{join .DstIfaces ", "}} } {{end}}{{if .SrcAddrs}}ip saddr { {{join .SrcAddrs ", "}} } {{end}}{{if .DstAddrs}}ip daddr { {{join .DstAddrs ", "}} } {{end}}{{with .Service}}{{if and (or (eq .Proto "tcp") (eq .Proto "udp")) .PortStart}}{{.Proto}} dport {{.PortStart}}{{if and .PortEnd (ne .PortEnd .PortStart)}}-{{.PortEnd}}{{end}} {{else if eq .Proto "icmp"}}ip protocol icmp {{else if eq .Proto "icmpv6"}}ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 {{end}}{{end}}{{if .Log}}log prefix "edgeguard:{{.RuleID}} " {{end}}{{.Action}}
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{{end}}
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}
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chain forward {
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type filter hook forward priority 0; policy drop;
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ct state established,related accept
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ct state invalid drop
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# DNAT-rewrites aus prerouting_nat haben den ct.status DNAT-Bit
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# gesetzt — die müssen forward-passieren dürfen, sonst kommen
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# Port-Forwards (z.B. :2030 → 10.10.20.12:22) zwar durch das
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# NAT-Rewrite, scheitern aber an policy=drop. Equivalent zu
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# iptables -m conntrack --ctstate DNAT.
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ct status dnat accept
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# Auto-Forward für SNAT/Masquerade-Origin-Pakete. Forward-chain
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# sieht das Paket VOR der postrouting-Translation; ct.status ist
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# also noch nicht "snat". Wir ziehen pro NAT-Rule das SrcCIDR
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# nach und erlauben new-state-Pakete von dort. Return-Pakete
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# gehen via ct state established schon durch.
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{{range .NATRules}}{{if or (eq .Kind "snat") (eq .Kind "masquerade")}}{{if .SrcCIDR}}
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ip saddr {{.SrcCIDR}} ct state new accept comment "auto-forward for NAT rule {{.ID}}"
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{{end}}{{end}}{{end}}
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}
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chain output {
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type filter hook output priority 0; policy accept;
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}
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chain prerouting_nat {
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type nat hook prerouting priority -100;
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{{range .NATRules}}{{if eq .Kind "dnat"}}
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# NAT {{.ID}} (dnat{{if .Comment}} — {{.Comment}}{{end}})
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{{""}}
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{{/* nft-Syntax: erst L3-match (ip saddr/daddr), DANN L4 (tcp/udp dport).
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Sonst quittiert der parser '... unexpected ip' an dieser Stelle. */}}
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{{if .InIfaces}}iifname { {{join .InIfaces ", "}} } {{end}}{{if .SrcCIDR}}ip saddr {{.SrcCIDR}} {{end}}{{if .DstCIDR}}ip daddr {{.DstCIDR}} {{end}}{{if and .Proto (ne .Proto "any")}}{{.Proto}} {{else}}meta l4proto { tcp, udp } {{end}}{{if .DPortStart}}dport {{.DPortStart}}{{if and .DPortEnd (ne .DPortEnd .DPortStart)}}-{{.DPortEnd}}{{end}} {{end}}{{if .TargetAddr}}dnat to {{.TargetAddr}}{{if .TargetPortStart}}:{{.TargetPortStart}}{{if and .TargetPortEnd (ne .TargetPortEnd .TargetPortStart)}}-{{.TargetPortEnd}}{{end}}{{end}}{{end}}
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{{end}}{{end}}
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}
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chain postrouting_nat {
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type nat hook postrouting priority 100;
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# Auto-Hairpin für DNAT-Pakete: alle in prerouting_nat
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# umgeschriebenen Pakete bekommen zusätzlich SNAT auf die
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# Box-IP des ausgehenden Iface (masquerade). Sonst antwortet
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# das DNAT-Ziel via seinem eigenen default-Gateway, das oft
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# nicht zur EdgeGuard-Box zeigt → SYN_SENT + UNREPLIED.
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# Trade-off: Backend sieht die Box-IP statt der echten
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# client-IP (für Logging / Geo-Block: später optional via
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# NAT-Rule-Flag preserve_client_ip).
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ct status dnat masquerade
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{{range .NATRules}}{{if eq .Kind "snat"}}
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# NAT {{.ID}} (snat{{if .Comment}} — {{.Comment}}{{end}})
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{{""}}
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{{if .OutIfaces}}oifname { {{join .OutIfaces ", "}} } {{end}}{{if .SrcCIDR}}ip saddr {{.SrcCIDR}} {{end}}{{if .TargetAddr}}snat to {{.TargetAddr}}{{end}}
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{{end}}{{if eq .Kind "masquerade"}}
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# NAT {{.ID}} (masquerade{{if .Comment}} — {{.Comment}}{{end}})
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{{""}}
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{{if .OutIfaces}}oifname { {{join .OutIfaces ", "}} } {{end}}{{if .SrcCIDR}}ip saddr {{.SrcCIDR}} {{end}}masquerade
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{{end}}{{end}}
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}
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}
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