Files
edgeguard-native/internal/firewall/firewall_ipv6_test.go
Debian 32ab2c7f47 chore(lint): Backlog auf 0 + golangci-lint als HARTER Gate — v1.3.3
Go-Quality-Baseline-Rollout ABGESCHLOSSEN.

Code-Quality-Backlog (55 → 0):
- errcheck: unbehandelte Close/Rollback/Remove explizit `_ =`; fmt.Sscanf
  `_, _ =` (Zero-Value degradiert sauber).
- unused: toter Code entfernt (nodeIDOrHostname, stripTrailingNewline,
  acme.Service.user, strFold + ungenutzter Import).
- noctx (net/http): http.NewRequestWithContext mit vorhandenem ctx.
- staticcheck: QF1001/S1009/ST1005/SA9003.
- contextcheck: detached-by-design-Stellen mit begründetem //nolint.

Zwei echte Bugs beim Aufräumen gefunden+gefixt:
- backup/remote SFTP-Upload: dst.Close()-Flush-Fehler wurde verschluckt →
  unvollständiges Remote-File galt als Erfolg. Jetzt geprüft+gemeldet.
- haproxy_test: leere if-Assertion (SA9003) testete faktisch nichts →
  echte t.Errorf-Prüfung (kein HSTS für HSTS-disabled Domain).

Bewusste Config-Entscheidungen (.golangci.yml):
- noctx-on-os/exec ausgeschlossen: System-Command-Reloads (systemctl/nft/
  wg/pg) dürfen NICHT an den Request-Context gebunden werden — ein Client-
  Disconnect darf keinen laufenden Reload mitten in der Ausführung killen.
  net/http-noctx bleibt voll aktiv. KEINE exec-Zeile im Code angefasst.
- rowserrcheck/sqlclosecheck raus (database/sql-Linter, bei pgx nur FPs).

Gate scharf gestellt: Makefile release-check ruft golangci-lint jetzt als
HARTEN Gate (install-if-missing, pinned v2.12.2). `make release-check`
grün: vet, golangci-lint, govulncheck, build, test -race.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 00:49:07 +02:00

184 lines
6.5 KiB
Go

package firewall
import (
"bytes"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestAddrFamily(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"1.2.3.4": "ip",
"10.0.0.0/24": "ip",
"1.2.3.4-1.2.3.10": "ip",
"2001:db8::1": "ip6",
"fd00::/64": "ip6",
"2001:db8::1-2001:db8::5": "ip6",
"example.com": "",
"": "",
}
for in, want := range cases {
if got := addrFamily(in); got != want {
t.Errorf("addrFamily(%q)=%q want %q", in, got, want)
}
}
}
func TestExpandFamilyLegs_splitsByFamily(t *testing.T) {
r := ResolvedRule{
ID: 1, Action: "accept",
SrcAddrs: []string{"10.0.0.0/24", "fd00::/64"},
DstAddrs: []string{"1.2.3.4", "2001:db8::1"},
}
legs := expandFamilyLegs(r, ResolvedService{}, false)
if len(legs) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 legs (v4+v6), got %d", len(legs))
}
var v4, v6 *RuleLeg
for i := range legs {
switch legs[i].L3 {
case "ip":
v4 = &legs[i]
case "ip6":
v6 = &legs[i]
}
}
if v4 == nil || v6 == nil {
t.Fatalf("missing family leg: %+v", legs)
}
if len(v4.SrcAddrs) != 1 || v4.SrcAddrs[0] != "10.0.0.0/24" || v4.DstAddrs[0] != "1.2.3.4" {
t.Errorf("v4 leg wrong: src=%v dst=%v", v4.SrcAddrs, v4.DstAddrs)
}
if len(v6.SrcAddrs) != 1 || v6.SrcAddrs[0] != "fd00::/64" || v6.DstAddrs[0] != "2001:db8::1" {
t.Errorf("v6 leg wrong: src=%v dst=%v", v6.SrcAddrs, v6.DstAddrs)
}
}
func TestExpandFamilyLegs_addresslessIsAgnostic(t *testing.T) {
legs := expandFamilyLegs(ResolvedRule{ID: 2, Action: "accept"}, ResolvedService{}, false)
if len(legs) != 1 || legs[0].L3 != "" {
t.Fatalf("addressless rule must be a single agnostic leg, got %d legs L3=%q", len(legs), legs[0].L3)
}
}
func TestExpandFamilyLegs_oneFamilyOnly(t *testing.T) {
// src nur v4, dst nur v4 → genau eine v4-Zeile (kein leerer v6-Leg).
r := ResolvedRule{ID: 3, Action: "drop", SrcAddrs: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}}
legs := expandFamilyLegs(r, ResolvedService{}, false)
if len(legs) != 1 || legs[0].L3 != "ip" {
t.Fatalf("v4-only rule want 1 ip leg, got %+v", legs)
}
}
func TestExpandFamilyLegs_icmpFamilyMatch(t *testing.T) {
r6 := ResolvedRule{ID: 4, Action: "accept", SrcAddrs: []string{"fd00::/64"}}
if legs := expandFamilyLegs(r6, ResolvedService{Proto: "icmpv6"}, true); len(legs) != 1 || legs[0].L3 != "ip6" {
t.Fatalf("icmpv6+v6 want 1 ip6 leg, got %+v", legs)
}
if legs := expandFamilyLegs(r6, ResolvedService{Proto: "icmp"}, true); len(legs) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("icmp on v6-only addrs want 0 legs, got %+v", legs)
}
}
func TestNatFamily(t *testing.T) {
if _, ok := natFamily(ResolvedNATRule{SrcCIDR: "10.0.0.0/24", TargetAddr: "2001:db8::1"}); ok {
t.Error("mixed v4/v6 NAT must be rejected (ok=false)")
}
if fam, ok := natFamily(ResolvedNATRule{TargetAddr: "2001:db8::1"}); !ok || fam != "ip6" {
t.Errorf("v6 NAT: fam=%q ok=%v want ip6/true", fam, ok)
}
if fam, ok := natFamily(ResolvedNATRule{SrcCIDR: "10.0.0.0/24"}); !ok || fam != "ip" {
t.Errorf("v4 NAT: fam=%q ok=%v want ip/true", fam, ok)
}
if fam, ok := natFamily(ResolvedNATRule{}); !ok || fam != "ip" {
t.Errorf("addressless NAT: fam=%q ok=%v want ip/true (v4 default)", fam, ok)
}
}
// renderView ist ein gemischter v4/v6-View, der alle geänderten
// Template-Zweige berührt.
func renderView(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
view := &View{
PeerIPv4: []string{"10.0.0.1"},
PeerIPv6: []string{"fd00::1"},
Legs: []RuleLeg{
{RuleID: 1, Action: "accept", L3: "ip", SrcAddrs: []string{"10.0.0.0/24"}, Service: ResolvedService{Proto: "tcp", PortStart: 443}},
{RuleID: 1, Action: "accept", L3: "ip6", SrcAddrs: []string{"fd00::/64"}, Service: ResolvedService{Proto: "tcp", PortStart: 443}},
{RuleID: 2, Action: "accept", Service: ResolvedService{Proto: "icmpv6"}}, // adresslos, agnostic
},
NATRules: []ResolvedNATRule{
{ID: 5, Kind: "dnat", L3: "ip6", DstCIDR: "2001:db8::/64", Proto: "tcp", DPortStart: 80, TargetAddr: "fd00::2", TargetHost: "[fd00::2]", TargetPortStart: 8080},
{ID: 6, Kind: "snat", L3: "ip6", SrcCIDR: "fd00::/64", TargetAddr: "2001:db8::99"},
{ID: 7, Kind: "dnat", L3: "ip", DstCIDR: "1.2.3.4", Proto: "tcp", DPortStart: 80, TargetAddr: "10.0.0.5", TargetHost: "10.0.0.5", TargetPortStart: 80},
},
WGSiteMasq: []WGSiteMasqEntry{{Iface: "wg7", VPNNet: "fd00:99::/64", L3: "ip6"}},
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := tpl.Execute(&buf, view); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("template execute: %v", err)
}
return buf.String()
}
func TestTemplate_v6AndV4Render(t *testing.T) {
out := renderView(t)
mustContain := []string{
"ip saddr { 10.0.0.0/24 }", // v4-Regel unverändert
"ip6 saddr { fd00::/64 }", // v6-Regel
"ip6 daddr 2001:db8::/64", // v6-DNAT-Match
"dnat to [fd00::2]:8080", // v6-DNAT-Target geklammert
"dnat to 10.0.0.5:80", // v4-DNAT-Target unverändert
"ip6 saddr fd00::/64 snat to 2001:db8::99",
`oifname "wg7" ip6 saddr fd00:99::/64 masquerade`,
}
for _, w := range mustContain {
if !strings.Contains(out, w) {
t.Errorf("output missing %q\n----\n%s", w, out)
}
}
// v6-Adressen dürfen NIEMALS in einem ip-saddr/daddr-Set landen.
if strings.Contains(out, "ip saddr { fd00") || strings.Contains(out, "ip daddr { fd00") ||
strings.Contains(out, "ip saddr { 2001") {
t.Errorf("v6 address leaked into IPv4 match\n----\n%s", out)
}
}
// TestTemplate_nftSyntax validiert das gerenderte Ruleset mit `nft -c -f`
// (Check-Modus, kein Apply). Wird übersprungen, wenn nft nicht installiert
// ist (z.B. CI ohne nft).
func TestTemplate_nftSyntax(t *testing.T) {
nft, err := exec.LookPath("nft")
if err != nil {
t.Skip("nft binary not available — skipping syntax check")
}
out := renderView(t)
f, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "ruleset-*.nft")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := f.WriteString(out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = f.Close()
// `nft -c` liest die Kernel-Ruleset-Cache via netlink → braucht root.
// Als nicht-root via sudo -n versuchen; klappt das nicht, skip statt fail
// (auf den Nodes rendert/prüft edgeguard ohnehin als root).
var cmd *exec.Cmd
if os.Geteuid() == 0 {
cmd = exec.Command(nft, "-c", "-f", f.Name())
} else {
cmd = exec.Command("sudo", "-n", nft, "-c", "-f", f.Name())
}
combined, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
msg := string(combined)
if strings.Contains(msg, "Operation not permitted") || strings.Contains(msg, "a password is required") || strings.Contains(msg, "may not run sudo") {
t.Skipf("nft -c needs root (no usable sudo): %s", strings.TrimSpace(msg))
}
t.Fatalf("nft -c -f rejected the generated ruleset: %v\n%s\n----\n%s", err, combined, out)
}
}