4e01b4569c
- setup.State.IPv6Enabled + Store.SetIPv6Enabled() - GET/POST /system/ipv6 im SystemHandler; HAProxy-Reload on save - HAProxy-Template: bind [::]:80, [::]:443, quic6@:443, [::]:3443 werden nur emittiert wenn IPv6Enabled=true - haproxy.View.IPv6Enabled aus SetupStore befüllt - Settings-UI: neues IPv6-Card (zwischen Auto-Update und Passwort) - i18n de+en ergänzt Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
199 lines
9.1 KiB
Smarty
199 lines
9.1 KiB
Smarty
# Generated by edgeguard-api — DO NOT EDIT.
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# Source: internal/haproxy/haproxy.go (template: haproxy.cfg.tpl).
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# Re-generate via `edgeguard-ctl render-config`.
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global
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log /dev/log local0 info
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log /dev/log local1 notice
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user haproxy
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group haproxy
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daemon
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ssl-default-bind-options ssl-min-ver TLSv1.2 no-tls-tickets
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ssl-default-bind-ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
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# HAProxy 3.0.x in Trixie ist mit USE_QUIC=1 + USE_QUIC_OPENSSL_COMPAT=1
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# gebaut; die System-OpenSSL kann QUIC aber nur über den Kompat-Layer.
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# Ohne dieses Flag verweigert HAProxy `bind quic4@…` mit "this SSL
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# library does not support the QUIC protocol".
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limited-quic
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defaults
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log global
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mode http
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option httplog
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option dontlognull
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option forwardfor
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timeout connect 5s
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timeout client 60s
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timeout server 60s
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timeout http-request 10s
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# timeout tunnel wird PER BACKEND aktiviert (websocket-Flag),
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# damit nur WS-Workloads die lange Idle-Toleranz haben und normale
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# HTTP-Backends saubere Connection-Hygiene behalten.
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# ── Public :80 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# ACME-01 challenges proxy to edgeguard-api which serves the webroot.
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# Everything else redirects to HTTPS.
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frontend public_http
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bind :80
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{{- if .IPv6Enabled}}
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bind [::]:80
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{{- end}}
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acl is_acme path_beg /.well-known/acme-challenge/
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# Redirect to HTTPS first (skipped for ACME paths) — must come
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# before use_backend so HAProxy doesn't warn about ordering.
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http-request redirect scheme https code 301 unless is_acme
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use_backend api_backend if is_acme
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# ── Public :443 (Customer-Backends only) ──────────────────────────────
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# TLS termination. Reads certs from /etc/edgeguard/tls/ — postinst
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# seeds a self-signed _default.pem so HAProxy starts before certbot
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# has issued anything.
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#
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# WICHTIG: kein default_backend → unbekannte Hosts kriegen 503. Die
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# Management-UI sitzt bewusst auf :3443 (siehe mgmt_https unten),
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# damit ein versehentlich offengelassenes Wildcard-DNS nie auf das
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# Admin-Panel fällt. mailgateway/enconf-Pattern.
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frontend public_https
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bind :443 ssl crt /etc/edgeguard/tls/ alpn h2,http/1.1
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# HTTP/3 via QUIC (UDP/443). HAProxy 3.0.x ist mit USE_QUIC=1
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# gebaut; Browser fallen via Alt-Svc-Header (siehe unten) für
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# Folge-Requests auf h3 zurück.
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bind quic4@:443 ssl crt /etc/edgeguard/tls/ alpn h3
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{{- if .IPv6Enabled}}
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bind [::]:443 ssl crt /etc/edgeguard/tls/ alpn h2,http/1.1
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bind quic6@:443 ssl crt /etc/edgeguard/tls/ alpn h3
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{{- end}}
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# Alt-Svc: signalisiert dass h3 auf demselben Port verfügbar ist.
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# ma=86400 = Browser darf den Hinweis 24h cachen.
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http-response set-header Alt-Svc "h3=\":443\"; ma=86400"
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# Client-IP-Weiterleitung an Backends. `option forwardfor` (defaults)
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# setzt X-Forwarded-For; wir ergänzen Proto + RealIP damit Apps
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# erkennen können (a) dass der Client HTTPS sprach und (b) die
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# echte Source-IP ohne XFF-Chain-Parsing brauchen.
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http-request set-header X-Forwarded-Proto https
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http-request set-header X-Real-IP %[src]
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{{- if .GlobalMaintenance}}
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# Whole-Box-Maintenance — Settings → Maintenance-Mode aktiv. Dieser
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# Block kommt VOR allen per-Domain ACLs und blockt JEDEN Customer-
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# Request. Mgmt-UI auf :3443 (mgmt_https) ist davon nicht betroffen.
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http-request return status 503 content-type "text/plain; charset=utf-8" string "{{.GlobalMaintenanceMessage}}"
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{{- end}}
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{{- range $d := .Domains}}
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{{- if $d.RedirectFromHost}}
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# www-Redirect: {{$d.RedirectFromHost}} → {{$d.Name}}
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http-request redirect prefix https://{{$d.Name}} code 301 if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.RedirectFromHost}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- if $d.MaintenanceMode}}
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# Wartungs-Modus für {{$d.Name}} — alle Requests werden mit 503 beantwortet.
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http-request return status 503 content-type "text/plain; charset=utf-8" string "{{$d.MaintMessage}}" if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- if $d.MaxBodyBytes}}
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# Body-Size-Cap für {{$d.Name}}: {{$d.MaxBodyBytes}} Bytes.
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# Nur Content-Length wird geprüft — Chunked-Bodies wären erst nach
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# http-buffer-request abgreifbar, das wollen wir auf Frontend-Level
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# nicht aktivieren (verbraucht RAM pro Connection).
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http-request deny deny_status 413 if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} } { req.hdr_val(content-length) -m int gt {{$d.MaxBodyBytes}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- if $d.RateLimitThreshold}}
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# Rate-Limit für {{$d.Name}}: {{$d.RateLimitRPS}} req/s pro Client-IP
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# (Schwelle = rps × 10s-Fenster = {{$d.RateLimitThreshold}} hits).
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http-request track-sc0 src table rl_{{$d.ID}} if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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http-request deny deny_status 429 if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} } { sc_http_req_rate(0) gt {{$d.RateLimitThreshold}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- if $d.HSTSHeader}}
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# del + set damit ein vom Backend gesetztes HSTS (z. B. nginx mit
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# eigener add_header-Direktive) garantiert von unserer Policy
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# überschrieben wird — sonst tauchen 2 Strict-Transport-Security
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# Header in der Response auf.
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http-response del-header Strict-Transport-Security if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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http-response set-header Strict-Transport-Security "{{$d.HSTSHeader}}" if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- if $d.DisableH3}}
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# HTTP/3 (QUIC) Werbung für diese Domain unterdrücken: Alt-Svc-Header
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# entfernen damit Browser nicht auf h3 upgraden. Der globale set-header
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# oben hat ihn bereits gesetzt; dieses del-header kommt DANACH und
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# überschreibt ihn für Requests an diese Domain.
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http-response del-header Alt-Svc if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- range $h := $d.ResponseHeaders}}
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http-response del-header {{$h.Name}} if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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http-response set-header {{$h.Name}} "{{$h.Value}}" if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- range $r := $d.Routes}}
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use_backend eg_backend_{{$r.BackendID}} if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} } { path_beg {{$r.PathPrefix}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- if $d.PrimaryBackendID}}
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use_backend eg_backend_{{$d.PrimaryBackendID}} if { hdr(host) -i {{$d.Name}} }
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{{- end}}
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{{- end}}
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# ── Mgmt :3443 (Admin-UI only) ────────────────────────────────────────
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# Eigener Port für die Management-UI — gleicher Cert-Pool, aber kein
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# Customer-Routing. Anti-Lockout-Regel im nft-Template lässt 3443
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# immer durch. Erreichbar über jede Domain die auf die Box zeigt
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# (Hostname egal — default_backend), inkl. der direkten IP.
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frontend mgmt_https
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bind :3443 ssl crt /etc/edgeguard/tls/ alpn h2,http/1.1
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{{- if .IPv6Enabled}}
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bind [::]:3443 ssl crt /etc/edgeguard/tls/ alpn h2,http/1.1
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{{- end}}
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http-response set-header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000"
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http-request set-header X-Forwarded-Proto https
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http-request set-header X-Real-IP %[src]
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default_backend api_backend
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# ── Internal stats ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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frontend internal_stats
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bind 127.0.0.1:8404
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stats enable
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stats uri /stats
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stats refresh 10s
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stats admin if { src 127.0.0.1 }
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# ── Backends ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# edgeguard-api itself: management UI, REST API, ACME webroot.
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# timeout tunnel 1h: /api/v1/firewall/log/live ist ein langlebiger
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# WebSocket-Stream — ohne Tunnel-Override fällt er nach `timeout
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# server 60s` ohne Events um.
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backend api_backend
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timeout tunnel 1h
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server api1 127.0.0.1:9443 check
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{{- /* Per-Domain Rate-Limit Stick-Tables.
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Eigenes Backend pro Domain damit verschiedene Schwellen nicht
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miteinander interferieren; HAProxy 3.0 erlaubt mehrere
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stick-table-Backends die per Frontend mit track-sc0 angesteuert
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werden. expire 10s hält den Speicher knapp. */ -}}
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{{- range $d := .Domains}}
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{{- if $d.RateLimitThreshold}}
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backend rl_{{$d.ID}}
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# Rate-Limit-Counter für {{$d.Name}}; gefüllt von public_https.
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stick-table type ip size 100k expire 10s store http_req_rate(10s)
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{{- end}}
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{{- end}}
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{{- range $b := .Backends}}
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backend eg_backend_{{$b.ID}}
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balance {{$b.LBAlgorithm}}
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{{- if $b.WebSocket}}
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timeout tunnel 1h
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{{- end}}
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{{- if $b.HealthCheckPath}}
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option httpchk
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http-check send meth GET uri {{$b.HealthCheckPath}}
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{{- end}}
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{{- range $s := $b.Servers}}
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server {{$s.Name | safeID}} {{$s.Address}}:{{$s.Port}}{{if eq $b.Scheme "https"}} ssl verify none alpn {{if $b.ForceHTTP1}}http/1.1{{else}}h2,http/1.1{{end}}{{end}}{{if $b.HealthCheckPath}} check inter 5s{{if eq $b.Scheme "https"}} check-alpn http/1.1{{end}}{{end}} weight {{$s.Weight}}{{if $s.Backup}} backup{{end}}
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{{- end}}
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{{- end}}
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