Files
edgeguard-native/internal/waf/spoe.go
Debian 134466293d fix(waf): Setup-Regeln (900xxx–909xxx) nicht als Alerts speichern — v1.2.83
CRS 900xxx/901xxx (init, body inspection, paranoia setup) feuern auf
JEDEM Request — keine Security-Events. Filter: nur rule_id >= 910000
wird als Alert in DB geschrieben. Buffer 512 → 2048.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-03 13:45:04 +02:00

187 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
package waf
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/types"
"github.com/dropmorepackets/haproxy-go/pkg/encoding"
"github.com/dropmorepackets/haproxy-go/spop"
)
// SPOEAgent wraps the haproxy-go SPOE server and dispatches each
// inspected request to the appropriate per-domain Coraza engine.
type SPOEAgent struct {
Manager *Manager
AlertWriter *AlertWriter
Addr string
}
// ListenAndServe starts the SPOE agent. Blocks until ctx is cancelled.
func (a *SPOEAgent) ListenAndServe(ctx context.Context) error {
agent := spop.Agent{
Addr: a.Addr,
Handler: spop.HandlerFunc(a.handle),
BaseContext: ctx,
}
return agent.ListenAndServe()
}
// handle is called by the haproxy-go SPOE library for every NOTIFY
// frame HAProxy sends. It extracts the request data, runs Coraza,
// and optionally sets a txn.waf.status variable to trigger a deny ACL.
func (a *SPOEAgent) handle(ctx context.Context, w *encoding.ActionWriter, m *encoding.Message) {
var (
clientIP string
method string
uri string // full request URI (path + optional ?query)
httpVer string
host string
rawHdrs string
)
// Iterate over the key-value pairs HAProxy sent with this message.
entry := encoding.AcquireKVEntry()
defer encoding.ReleaseKVEntry(entry)
for m.KV.Next(entry) {
switch {
case entry.NameEquals("src"):
addr := entry.ValueAddr()
if addr.IsValid() {
clientIP = addr.String()
}
case entry.NameEquals("method"):
method = string(entry.ValueBytes())
case entry.NameEquals("uri"):
uri = string(entry.ValueBytes())
case entry.NameEquals("ver"):
httpVer = string(entry.ValueBytes())
case entry.NameEquals("host"):
host = string(entry.ValueBytes())
case entry.NameEquals("headers"):
rawHdrs = string(entry.ValueBytes())
}
entry.Reset()
}
if host == "" {
return
}
de, ok := a.Manager.GetForHost(host)
if !ok {
return // WAF not configured or disabled for this domain
}
tx := de.WAF.NewTransaction()
defer func() {
tx.ProcessLogging()
if err := tx.Close(); err != nil {
slog.Warn("waf: tx.Close", "error", err)
}
}()
// Feed connection metadata.
if clientIP != "" {
tx.ProcessConnection(clientIP, 0, "", 0)
}
if uri == "" {
uri = "/"
}
if httpVer == "" {
httpVer = "HTTP/1.1"
}
tx.ProcessURI(uri, method, httpVer)
// Feed Host header first (required by many CRS rules).
tx.AddRequestHeader("Host", host)
// Parse and feed all raw headers.
parseHeaders(rawHdrs, func(name, val string) {
if !strings.EqualFold(name, "host") { // already added above
tx.AddRequestHeader(name, val)
}
})
// Evaluate request headers.
interruption := tx.ProcessRequestHeaders()
// Log all matched rules (detection + blocking).
for _, mr := range tx.MatchedRules() {
a.sendAlert(host, clientIP, method, uri, mr, interruption != nil)
}
if interruption != nil {
status := interruption.Status
if status == 0 {
status = http.StatusForbidden
}
slog.Info("waf: request blocked",
"host", host, "method", method, "uri", uri,
"client", clientIP, "status", status, "rule", interruption.RuleID,
)
if de.Mode == "blocking" {
if err := w.SetInt64(encoding.VarScopeTransaction, "status", int64(status)); err != nil {
slog.Warn("waf: SetInt64 status", "error", err)
}
}
}
}
// sendAlert enqueues a WAF alert for async DB write.
// Control-flow rules (pass+nolog with empty message) are skipped —
// they are CRS paranoia-level skip-markers, not real detections.
func (a *SPOEAgent) sendAlert(host, clientIP, method, uri string, mr types.MatchedRule, blocked bool) {
if a.AlertWriter == nil {
return
}
ruleID := mr.Rule().ID()
// Skip CRS setup/initialization rules (900xxx909xxx) — they fire on
// every request as part of CRS init and are not security events.
// Real detection rules start at 910xxx (IP reputation) and above.
if ruleID > 0 && ruleID < 910000 {
return
}
// Skip control-flow rules with no message (PL-skip markers).
if mr.Message() == "" {
return
}
action := "detected"
if blocked && mr.Disruptive() {
action = "blocked"
}
a.AlertWriter.Send(Alert{
Hostname: host,
ClientIP: clientIP,
Method: method,
URI: uri,
RuleID: mr.Rule().ID(),
RuleMsg: mr.Message(),
Severity: mr.Rule().Severity().String(),
Action: action,
})
}
// parseHeaders splits HAProxy raw headers ("Name: value\r\n…") and
// calls fn for each valid header line.
func parseHeaders(raw string, fn func(name, val string)) {
for _, line := range strings.Split(raw, "\n") {
line = strings.TrimRight(line, "\r")
if line == "" {
continue
}
idx := strings.IndexByte(line, ':')
if idx <= 0 {
continue
}
name := strings.TrimSpace(line[:idx])
val := strings.TrimSpace(line[idx+1:])
if name != "" {
fn(name, val)
}
}
}