Registration creates a new account plus its first user; login
authenticates an existing one; both set a deklarix_session cookie
(HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure only when the request itself came
over TLS — hardcoding Secure=true would break local http://localhost
development, since browsers won't store a Secure cookie over plaintext).
requirePage protects full-page GETs (redirects to /login); requireAPI
protects the htmx/download endpoints (401, since those are only ever
called from an already-authenticated page — an unauthenticated hit
there is the exception, e.g. a session expiring mid-use).
handleCheck now creates submissions under the current account.
handleArchive and handleDossierDownload compare the submission's
account against the caller's and return 404 on mismatch — not 403,
which would confirm the ID exists to a different tenant. Login failure
uses the same message for "no such email" and "wrong password" to avoid
account enumeration.
Restructured templates along the way: layout.html now only holds
reusable fragments ("head", "nav"); each full page (index/login/register)
is its own top-level named template. The previous layout+content nesting
would have broken the moment a second page defined "content" — Go's
html/template keys blocks by name across the whole parsed set, not per
file, so two pages both defining "content" would silently overwrite each
other.
Verified against a real running instance (not just Go's test recorder):
started the compiled binary against a fresh Postgres and drove the whole
flow with curl — anonymous redirect, registration setting a real cookie,
authenticated page load, logout clearing both the cookie and the
server-side session row, and being locked out again afterward.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
internal/auth is pure logic (bcrypt hashing, session token generation)
with no DB access — persistence for account/app_user/session lives in
internal/store like everything else, via migration 0003.
account is the tenant (Mandant); app_user is a login inside one account;
session is a real server-side row (not a signed stateless token) so
logout can actually end a session rather than the client just
forgetting a JWT. submission.account_id is NOT NULL — added directly
rather than the nullable-then-backfill dance, since no submission rows
exist anywhere yet (verified empty on the test server before writing
the migration). Added as migration 0003 (new file), not folded into an
earlier one, since 0001/0002 are already applied on the test server.
store.ErrNotFound lets callers distinguish "wrong email" / "unknown
session" from a genuine DB error — matters for login, where those two
cases should both fail closed but for different reasons.
Not yet wired into internal/web — that's the next commit. All of this
is tested against real Postgres (14 store tests green) but isn't
reachable from any HTTP handler yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Content assembly (BuildContent) is separate from PDF drawing (Render),
so the actual business logic — what goes into the evidence dossier, in
what form, with which mandatory fields — is unit-testable without
parsing PDF bytes. BuildContent refuses to produce a dossier missing
its evidentiary fields (timestamp token, asset/metadata hash, platform)
rather than emitting one with silently empty proof sections. Every
dossier carries the "this is not legal advice" disclaimer required by
CLAUDE.md's guardrails.
Uses github.com/go-pdf/fpdf (actively maintained fork of jung-kurt/
gofpdf, no dependencies beyond the Go stdlib) for rendering. Its core
fonts use cp1252 internally, so a small cp1252.map (copied from the
fpdf module, embedded via go:embed) drives UnicodeTranslator — German
umlauts render correctly without needing an external font file at
runtime, keeping Deklarix a single binary. Verified visually with
pdftotext/pdfinfo against a generated sample.
Tests build a real, structurally valid RFC-3161 token offline (a
throwaway self-signed cert + timestamp.Timestamp.CreateResponse), so
BuildContent/Render/Generate are fully tested without hitting a real
TSA — unlike the network-gated integration test in internal/evidence.
Also adds evidence.TimestampTime(), extracted from the parsing logic
already used by the TSA client, since the dossier needs to show the
timestamped time to a human reader.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
HTTPTimestamper builds a Request directly from a precomputed SHA-256
digest (Request{HashAlgorithm, HashedMessage, Nonce}.Marshal(), not
CreateRequest(io.Reader) which would hash the input itself), POSTs it to
a TSA, and validates that the parsed response's hash algorithm, hashed
message and nonce actually match what was sent before accepting the
token — a response that doesn't match the request isn't a valid
timestamp for that hash, regardless of whether it parses.
Uses github.com/digitorus/timestamp for the RFC-3161/ASN.1 encoding
rather than hand-rolling it.
TSA choice (open point in CLAUDE.md): FreeTSA.org for now — free,
RFC-3161-compliant, verified end-to-end with a live smoke test, but
not eIDAS-qualified. Documented as needing an upgrade to a qualified
provider (D-Trust, Bundesdruckerei, ...) before real customer use, same
treatment as the open legal questions in rules/OPEN.md.
Tests cover request/response validation without network (hash size
guard, a fake server that parses and checks the incoming request,
non-200 and malformed-response handling) plus a real integration test
against FreeTSA gated behind DEKLARIX_TSA_INTEGRATION, mirroring the
DATABASE_URL-gated pattern in internal/store.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
internal/rules implements Stufe 2 from the core principle: the LLM
extracts facts, this deterministic engine judges them against versioned
YAML rules. Facts/Condition/Rule/Finding types, a loader that refuses to
load on a missing id/version or a duplicate rule id rather than silently
skipping a bad file, and Evaluate() matching facts against rules.
Two real rules grounded in verified research (see rules/OPEN.md for the
open questions that surfaced along the way):
- WK-001: no disclosure at all despite consideration (§ 5a Abs. 4 UWG,
§ 22 Abs. 1 MStV)
- WK-004: disclosure present but hidden behind a "mehr anzeigen" cut
(§ 5a Abs. 4 UWG, Leitfaden der Medienanstalten, LG Köln 12.05.2026)
The two are deliberately disjoint (WK-004 requires disclosure_present=
true) so a post with no disclosure at all doesn't double-fire both
rules. Golden suite in testdata/golden/ covers both rules plus two clean
cases; it's this suite, not the UI, that's the actual asset per
CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
internal/store connects via pgx and runs golang-migrate migrations
embedded in the binary (go:embed), so Deklarix stays a single binary
despite the move to Postgres. Schema covers the five MVP tables
(submission, asset, extraction, finding, evidence_package, participant).
extraction, finding and evidence_package are append-only by design: a
Postgres trigger rejects UPDATE/DELETE outright, since a corrigible
evidence archive isn't an evidence archive. Corrections to a finding are
new rows whose supersedes column points at the row they replace (set at
INSERT time on the new row, since the trigger blocks UPDATE on the old
one) — "currently valid" findings are the ones no other row supersedes.
scripts/test.sh now spins up a disposable Postgres container so the
store's integration tests (including the append-only guarantee) actually
run on every test.sh/release.sh invocation instead of silently skipping
for lack of DATABASE_URL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
